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"Interested Adults" with Conflicts of Interest at
Juvenile Interrogations: Applying the Close
Relationship Standard of Emotional Distress
Andy Clarkt
The procedural protections of the Bill of Rights apply to juve-
niles,' but not in precisely the same way as they apply to adults. One
way juvenile protections differ is in the factors courts consider in de-
termining the validity of a juvenile's waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination or of the right to counsel. The presence of an "inter-
ested adult,"2 which usually is irrelevant to the validity of an adult's
waiver,3 is an important factor in a court's determination of whether a
juvenile's waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and thus valid.'
The United States Constitution requires that courts consider the pres-
ence of an interested adult as part of an evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding a juvenile's waiver. Some states go fur-
t B.A. 1998, Rice University; J.D. Candidate 2001,The University of Chicago.
1 See In re Gault, 387 US 1, 12-13 (1967) (observing that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
2 The phrase "interested adult" has legal meaning which may vary by jurisdiction. This
Comment applies the term to any adult who is not affiliated with the police or prosecution, who
is present with a juvenile during a custodial interrogation of the juvenile, and who, at least osten-
sibly, intends to improve the general welfare of the juvenile. See, for example, In re E. T C., 131 Vt
375,449 A2d 937,940 (1982) (ruling that the "adult must be one who is not only genuinely inter-
ested in the welfare of the juvenile, but completely independent from and disassociated with the
prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile"). A parent of the
juvenile is the most typical interested adult, but as this Comment will use the term, it does not
imply any particular relationship between the juvenile and the adult. This definition would in-
clude a lawyer for the juvenile.
3 A possible exception is waiver by a mentally deficient adult. See, for example, Henry v
Dees, 658 F2d 406,411 (5th Cir 1981) (noting that "the presence of counsel should be assured ab-
sent an unmistakable, knowing waiver of that assistance" in a case involving a mentally retarded
adult). The solution proposed by this Comment also applies to that situation.
4 These are the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US
436, 444 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that waivers be voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent).
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ther and require the presence of an interested adult to make admissi-
ble any statements made by a juvenile under interrogation.
A juvenile can contest the admission into evidence of statements
she made under interrogation by challenging the competency of the
interested adult who was present when she allegedly waived her privi-
lege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. One ground on
which to challenge an interested adult's competency is the existence of
a conflict of interest between the juvenile and the adult. Courts some-
times have found waivers invalid on the basis of such a conflict of in-
terest, but they have reached no consensus on when a conflict of in-
terest exists between a juvenile and an adult in the custodial interro-
gation setting!
This Comment argues that the "close relationship" test developed
in negligent infliction of emotional distress tort cases is an appropriate
way to uncover many of these conflicts of interest. Plaintiffs in negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress cases are often witnesses to a se-
vere physical injury caused by a defendant's negligence. In most juris-
dictions courts require such plaintiffs to show a close relationship to
the victim of the physical injury in order to recover for emotional in-jury suffered as a bystander. Close relationships are typically limited
to immediate family or similarly intimate relationships.
This Comment argues that a court should find an interested adult
incompetent if the adult has a "close relationship," as that phrase has
been defined in tort cases,' with any victim of the crime of which thejuvenile is accused, or with any other suspect in the crime. In jurisdic-
tions where emotional distress law is underdeveloped, this Comment
suggests as an alternative that a "close relationship" for the purposes
of determining a conflict of interest should be defined as an immedi-
ate family relationship.' This approach provides the police a clear rule
to apply in determining whom to have present at a juvenile's interro-
gation, fosters consistency between areas of the law, helps to avoid co-
erced confessions by juveniles, and ensures that coerced confessions
are inadmissible in court.
In Part I, the Comment describes the development and applica-
tion of constitutional and statutory protections of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel, as applied to juveniles. Part
5 See Part I.C.2.
6 See, for example, Dunphy v Gregor, 136 NJ 99, 642 A2d 372,380 (1994) (finding an "in-
timate familial relationship" sufficient to afford protection of bystander liability for a negligent
infliction of emotional distress tort).
7 Courts very rarely, if ever, hold that an immediate family relationship does not qualify as
a close relationship. Courts have included in the category of immediate family relationships, at a
minimum, relationships between an individual and her parents, spouse, children, and siblings. See
Part II.B.
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I then discusses the role of interested adults in juvenile waivers of
rights, and introduces the problem of conflicts of interest between
adults and juveniles and the use of such conflicts as grounds for chal-
lenging the competency of an interested adult. In Part II, the Com-
ment defines the elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, and describes the tests used by different jurisdictions to
limit the scope of emotional distress damages. Part II then discusses
the role of close relationships in determining reasonable foreseeability
in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, and examines par-
ticular relationships that have or have not been defined as close. In
Part III, the Comment takes the close relationship standard described
in Part II and applies it to conflicts of interest between juveniles and
interested adults as described in Part I. Part III then discusses prob-
lems with this approach and alternative solutions, and illustrates the
proposal's applications.
I. JUVENILE WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This Part first describes the history of the application to juveniles
of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel and
then surveys state approaches to juvenile waivers of rights. This Part
concludes by introducing the problem of conflicts of interest between
juveniles and interested adults.
A. Constitutional Protections and Their Application by Federal
Courts
The federal Constitution requires that juvenile waivers of the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel must be
evaluated, at a minimum, by the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the waiver. Part I.A.1 describes the development of this
standard. Part I.A.2 examines its application by federal courts.
1. Development of the "totality of the circumstances" test for
juvenile waivers.
Miranda v Arizona8 remains the centerpiece of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on custodial interrogation and the privilege
against self-incrimination.9 Miranda held that the prosecution may not
use in its case-in-chief statements obtained in a custodial interrogation
8 384 US 436 (1966).
9 The Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of the prophylactic measures out-
lined in Miranda. See Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428 (2000) (holding that Miranda warn-
ings are constitutionally based and therefore cannot be abrogated by an act of Congress).
2001]
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unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards by the police
that are sufficient to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."
In the absence of other fully effective safeguards, the Court requires
the police to warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." An accused may waive these rights, but only if the waiver
is made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."' 2 If the accused indi-
cates in any manner that he wishes to consult an attorney, or that he
does not wish to be interrogated, then the police must cease question-
ing.1
In re Gault,4 decided only a year after Miranda, held that
Miranda's requirements of warnings and of specific waivers also apply
to juveniles." The case involved a fifteen-year-old boy committed to
six years in a state juvenile detention facility for making obscene
phone calls.6 The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
applies to juvenile proceedings,'7 and reversed the juvenile's commit-
ment on the basis of numerous procedural defects. In holding that
the waiver provisions of Miranda apply to juveniles, the Court noted,
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to
waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination] by or on be-
half of children, and that there may well be some differences in
technique - but not in principle - depending upon the age of the
child and the presence and competence of parents."
The Court's mention of "the presence and competence of par-
ents" recalls two earlier cases that had reversed convictions of juve-
niles because of Due Process Clause violations, Haley v Ohio ° and
Gallegos v Colorado." In Haley, the Court ruled that a five-hour inter-
rogation of a fifteen-year-old boy, without a parent or counsel present
10 384 US at 444.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id at 444-45.
14 387 US 1 (1967).
15 Id at 55 ("We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is ap-
plicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.").
16 Idat7.
17 Id at 13-14 ("As to [juvenile delinquency] proceedings, there appears to be little current
dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play. The problem is to as-
certain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.").
18 The defects included failure to warn Gault of his right to remain silent, obtaining Gault's
confession outside the presence of his parents and counsel, and failure to allow him to confront
witnesses against him. Id at 56.
19 Idat 55.
20 332 US 596 (1948).
21 370 US 49 (1962).
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and without advising him of his right to counsel, violated due process.22
The Court did not specifically require the presence of an interested
adult to make a juvenile waiver valid,' 3 but the opinion repeatedly and
eloquently suggested the importance of an adult's presence:
[A juvenile] needs counsel and support .... He needs someone
on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he
knows it, crush him. No friend stood at [the accused's] side ....
No lawyer stood guard .... No counsel or friend was called.2
Gallegos, citing Haley, held that the five day detention of a four-
teen-year-old boy, absent the presence of his parents, an attorney, or
any adult friend, violated the Due Process Clause. As in Haley, the
Court did not absolutely require the presence of a friendly adult for
any waiver of a juvenile's privilege against self-incrimination, but it
considered the absence of an interested adult an important factor in
determining his confession to be invalid."
The Supreme Court has never required per se the presence of an
interested adult, and it made clear, in the 1979 case of Fare v Michael
C," that juvenile waivers of Fifth Amendment rights should be judged
by the "totality of the circumstances."2 In Fare, the Court reversed the
decision of the California Supreme Court excluding the sixteen-year-
old defendant's confession, which had been obtained without the
presence of an interested adult or attorney and after the defendant
22 332 US at 598-601. The opinion indicates that due process challenges to convictions of
juveniles might be subject to a different standard than challenges to adult convictions. "[W]hen,
as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the re-
cord must be used." Id at 599. But apparently the Court did not base its holding solely on the fact
that the accused was a juvenile: "What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved." Id.
23 The Court listed several factors, including lack of friendly adult presence, that made the
confession inadmissible:
The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact
that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police towards his
rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means which
the law should not sanction.
Id at 600-01.
24 Id at 600. Neither this opinion nor Gallegos relies specifically on a juvenile right to
counsel or requires police to notify juveniles of such a right. Gault was the first case in the Su-
preme Court to do so. See text accompanying notes 14-19.
25 370 US at 55 ("A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner
the protection which his own immaturity could not.").
26 Like Haley, Gallegos lists several factors that led to the Court's decision: "The youth of
the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to
bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice of
a lawyer or a friend." Id.
27 442 US 707 (1979).
2S Idat728.
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had requested to see his probation officer.29 The central issue in the
case was whether the juvenile's request to see his probation officer
was equivalent per se to a request to see an attorney for purposes of
Miranda; the Court held that it was not.f Rather, the Court ruled that
the admissibility of statements obtained after such a request was "to
be resolved on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the inter-
rogation."' According to Fare, the totality approach "includes evalua-
tion of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and in-
telligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights."'32
Fare does explicitly what Haley and Gallegos had done implicitly:
It treats a juvenile due process challenge as primarily a factual inquiry,
to be determined by the circumstances of the case rather than by ap-
plication of specific rules." Although in a sense Fare is contrary to the
trend seen in Miranda and Gault of structured, rules-based ap-
proaches to due process analysis, nothing in Fare conflicts with either
of those cases.
2. Application of the "totality of the circumstances" test by
federal courts.
The "totality of the circumstances" approach is the constitutional
standard by which the presence or competence of an interested adult
is judged. There is no per se rule at the federal level, either in the Con-
stitution or supplied by statute, requiring the presence of a competent
adult to validate a juvenile waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination. As the Eighth Circuit stated in United States v White
Bear,' "It is apparent . .. that the Court does not hold the presence of
parents or counsel necessary to obtain a valid confession or that juve-
niles are incapable of waiving the right to remain silent.""5 To similar
effect is the Fourth Circuit opinion in United States v Miller,' which
29 Id at 727-28.
30 Idat724.
31 Id at 728. The dissent, citing Haley, Gallegos, and Gault, argued that "Miranda requires
that interrogation cease whenever a juvenile requests an adult who is obligated to represent his
interests." Id at 729 (Marshall dissenting).
32 Id at 725. The list does not mention friendly adult presence or competence, as Haley,
Gallegos, and Gault had, but presumably the Court would include presence or competence of a
friendly adult in consideration; it states, "The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-
inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Id.
33 Although the Gallegos opinion uses the phrase "totality of circumstances," it seems un-
enthusiastic about doing so: "There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except the to-
tality of circumstances." Gallegos, 370 US at 55.
34 668 F2d 409 (8th Cir 1982).
35 Idat412.
36 453 F2d 634 (4th Cir 1972).
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found, in a case where the accused was questioned without any inter-
ested adult present, that the juvenile's age alone was not a decisive
factor and that a fourteen-year-old could in some cases intelligently
waive his rights."
Two federal cases illustrate the application of the federal totality
of the circumstances test. The first is Vance v Bordenkircher,a a typical
case arising under federal law that considers the necessity of the pres-
ence of an interested adult. In Vance, a fifteen-year-old boy with a
mental deficiency confessed to murder during a custodial interroga-
tion, outside the presence of any adult other than the police.39 Vance
subsequently was convicted of first-degree murder.4 The Fourth Cir-
cuit examined the totality of the circumstances and affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of relief on a habeas corpus petition.4 ' The court did
not treat the absence of an interested adult as a determinative factor,
especially in light of the fact that the boy's "mother was made aware
of the arrest and she voluntarily chose not to accompany him to jail.""
Because Vance had been informed of his rights, and the police had not
restricted Vance's access to his mother or any other interested adult,
the court considered the waiver valid.4
The second case is United States v Homer B.,' a case that arose
under federal law concerning the competence of an interested adult. In
that case the two juvenile defendants had given statements implicating
themselves in the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl.4 1 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's admission of the statements. One of the
defendants, Ernest J., was accompanied only by his older sister at the
time he waived his privilege against self-incrimination. '7 The court
gave some consideration to the fact that the adult present was the de-
fendant's sister, rather than a parent, ' but, in the end, did not find this
fact to weigh against admissibility.
37 Id at 636 ("We are not prepared to hold that a boy of fourteen is never capable of mak-
ing an intelligent waiver of his rights.... [N]o court has held that age alone is determinative.").
38 692 F2d 978 (4th Cir 1982).
39 Id at 979.
40 Id at 980.
41 Id at 981 ("[We] do not believe that it may be said that Vance's confession was involun-
tary.").
42 Id.
43 Id. The court found that everything about the interrogation except Vance's diminished
mental capacity tended to show voluntariness in his confession. Id.
44 1990 WL 79705 (9th Cir) (unpublished opinion).
45 Id at *1.
46 Id at *4.
47 Id at *2.
48 See id (noting that the interrogator questioned the sister about the location of their par-
ents).
49 See id at *4 (upholding admissibility of confession).
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B. State Approaches
Most states apply the constitutional totality of the circumstances
test to juvenile waivers, but some states have added per se rules that
require the presence of an interested adult to validate a juvenile's
waiver. Part I.B.1 examines the states that use the totality of the cir-
cumstances standard and shows some refinements they have made to
it. Part I.B.2 discusses the states that use per se rules and describes
their operation.
1. Totality of the circumstances test.
Although states may not establish criminal procedures that are
less protective than those guaranteed by the federal Constitution,
states are free to adopt more protective measures governing their own
criminal systems' treatment of juveniles in custodial interrogations.%
However, most states decline to go beyond the protections guaranteed
by the Constitution: they too apply a totality of the circumstances test
to juvenile waivers of the privilege against self-incrimination."
50 See, for example, Smith v Robbins, 528 US 259, 273 (2000) (observing in a criminal pro-
cedure case that "the states [have] wide discretion, subject to the minimum requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy"); Spencer v
Texas, 385 US 554, 569 (1967) (Stewart concurring) (noting, in criminal procedure case, that
"[t]he question is whether [Texas's] procedures fall below the minimum level the Fourteenth
Amendment will tolerate").
51 See Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-
Incrimination Privilege in the Juvenile Courts, 47 Kan L Rev 1035, 1051 (1999) ("[A] vast major-
ity of the states [have] recognized that the totality of the circumstances test is appropriate for as-
sessing the validity of waivers of the privilege against self-incrimination by juveniles.").
The following states utilize the totality of the circumstances rule: Alabama, Flowers v State,
586 S2d 978,983 (Ala Crim App 1991); Alaska, Quick v State, 599 P2d 712,719-20 (Alaska 1979);
Arizona, State v Rodriquez, 113 Ariz 409, 555 P2d 655, 658 (Ariz 1976); Arkansas, Miller v State,
338 Ark 445,994 SW2d 476,479-81 (1999); California, People v Lara, 67 Cal 2d 365,432 P2d 202,
215 (1967); Delaware, Haug v State, 406 A2d 38,43 (Del 1979); Florida, Ramirez v State, 739 S2d
568, 578 (Fla 1999); Georgia, Riley v State, 237 Ga 124, 226 SE2d 922, 926 (1976); Hawaii, In re
Doe, 90 Hawaii 246,978 P2d 684,686 (1999); Idaho, State v Doe, 131 Idaho 709,963 P2d 392,395(Idaho App 1998); Illinois, In re G.O., 191 I11 2d 37,727 NE2d 1003, 1012 (2000); Louisiana, State
v Fernandez, 712 S2d 485, 490 (La 1998); Maine, State v Nicholas S., 444 A2d 373, 377 (Maine
1982); Maryland, McIntyre v State, 309 Md 607,526 A2d 30,34 (1987); Michigan, People v Abra-
ham, 234 Mich App 640,599 NW2d 736,739-40 (1999); Minnesota, State v Scott, 584 NW2d 412,
417 (Minn 1998); Mississippi, Dancer v State, 721 S2d 583, 587 (Miss 1998); Missouri, State v
Pierce, 749 SW2d 397, 402 (Mo 1988); Nebraska, State v J.G., 231 Neb 530, 437 NW2d 153, 154(1989); Nevada, Elvik v State, 114 Nev 883,965 P2d 281,286 (1998); New Hampshire, In re Wesley
B., 764 A2d 888, 891 (NH 2000); New Jersey, State v Presha, 163 NJ 304, 748 A2d 1108, 1110(2000); New Mexico, State v Lasner, 129 NM 806, 14 P3d 1282,1285 (2000); New York, Matter of
Stanley C, 116 AD2d 209,500 NYS2d 445,448 (1986); North Dakota, Shirey v B.S., 496 NW2d 31,
34 (ND 1993); Ohio, In re Watson, 47 Ohio St 3d 86, 548 NE2d 210,214 (1989); Oregon, Juvenile
Dept of Lincoln County v Cook, 138 Or App 401, 909 P2d 202, 204 (1996); Pennsylvania,
Commonwealth v Williams, 504 Pa 511,475 A2d 1283, 1288 (1984); Rhode Island, In re Kean, 520
A2d 1271,1276 (RI 1987); South Dakota, State v Janis, 356 NW2d 916,918 (SD 1984); Tennessee,
State v Callahan, 979 SW2d 577,582-83 (Tenn 1998); Texas, In Interest of R.D., 627 SW2d 803,807
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State courts and legislatures sometimes refine the totality of the
circumstances standard by listing relevant factors to be considered.
Indiana, for example, requires by statute that "all the circumstances of
the waiver" be considered in deciding whether it was voluntary, and
provides a nonexclusive list of six factors to be included in considera-
tion. 2 The most extensive list of factors appears to be found in the
New Hampshire case of State v Benoit,53 and includes:
(1) the chronological age of the juvenile; (2) the apparent mental
age of the juvenile; (3) the educational level of the juvenile; (4)
the juvenile's physical condition; (5) the juvenile's previous deal-
ings with the police or court appearances; (6) the extent of the
explanation of rights; (7) the language of the warnings given; (8)
the methods of interrogation; (9) the length of interrogation; (10)
the length of time the juvenile was in custody; (11) whether the
juvenile was held incommunicado; (12) whether the juvenile was
afforded the opportunity to consult with an adult; (13) the juve-
nile's understanding of the offense charged; (14) whether the ju-
venile was warned of possible transfer to adult court; and (15)
whether the juvenile later repudiated the statement.
However, even this list is not comprehensive.
One rationale for the totality of the circumstances test is that ju-
venile courts are in the best position to judge the voluntariness of a
confession." Other arguments in favor of the totality of the circum-
stances approach and against the per se approach are that requiring
(Tex App 1982); Utah, State v Dutchie, 969 P2d 422,427 (Utah 1998); Vermont, State v Mears, 170
Vt 336,749 A2d 600,604 (2000); Virginia, Harris v Commonwealth, 217 Va 715,232 SE2d 751,755
(1977); Washington, State v Loukaitis, 1999 Wash App LEXIS 1955, *20; Wisconsin, State v Jones,
192 Wis 2d 78, 532 NW2d 79, 88 (1995); and Wyoming, Rubio v State, 939 P2d 238, 242 (Wyo
1997). There appear to be no reported decisions in Kentucky or South Carolina considering the
issue.
52 Ind Code Ann § 31-32-5-4 (West 1999). The factors listed are:
(1) The child's physical, mental, and emotional maturity.
(2) Whether the child or the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney understood the
consequences of the child's statements.
(3) Whether the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian had been informed of
the delinquent act with which the child was charged or of which the child was suspected.
(4) The length of time the child was held in custody before consulting with the child's par-
ent, guardian, or custodian.
(5) Whether there was any coercion, force, or inducement.
(6) Whether the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian had been advised of the
child's right to remain silent and to the appointment of counsel.
Id.
53 126 NH 6,490 A2d 295 (1985).
54 Id at 302.
55 See Fare, 442 US at 725 (noting that juvenile courts have "special expertise in this
area").
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an interested adult per se is overly protective, that it excludes from
evidence statements that are in fact knowingly and voluntarily given,
16and that it unnecessarily restricts the activity of the police. Since the
nature of the totality of the circumstances approach is that the weight
allocated to various criteria depends on the circumstances of a par-
ticular juvenile, the application of the test will vary greatly from case
to case. Some commentators have argued against the totality of the
circumstances approach for this reason, saying that it is speculative
and gives the police no way to know whether a juvenile's confession
will be admissible.58 One commentator has additionally argued that
courts have been too conservative in their application of the totality
test and have found waivers voluntary despite the presence of coer-
cive factors.9
2. Per se rules.
Some states, in addition to the federal constitutional require-
ments, have adopted per se rules.' These rules typically require the
presence of a parent or a similarly situated adult to validate any juve-
nile waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. A waiver by a
juvenile under a certain age is not valid if an interested adult is not
present, no matter how strongly other factors may suggest that the
56 See Kean, 520 A2d at 1275.
57 See Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation of Children and State Constitutions: Why Not
Videotape the MTV Generation?, 26 U Toledo L Rev 901,913 (1995) (observing that totality test
lacks "any criteria indicating the weight a court should give to the various circumstances sur-
rounding a custodial interrogation").
58 See id at 913-14 (arguing that "it is practically impossible for the police to determine
whether a juvenile's confession will be admissible" and observing that some courts have rejected
the totality of the circumstances test precisely because "the lack of specific standards leads to
speculation on the part of the authorities interrogating juveniles").
59 Idat 914.
60 The following states have adopted per se rules: Colorado, Colo Rev Stat Ann § 19-2-511
(West 1998 & Supp 2000) (making inadmissible statements made by juvenile under eighteen
without presence of interested adult, except in unusual circumstances); Connecticut, Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 46b-137 (West 1998 & Supp 2000) (requiring parental presence for statements made
by child to be admissible); Indiana, Ind Code Ann § 31-32-5-1 (West 1998) (requiring presence of
parent unless emancipated); Iowa, State v Means, 547 NW2d 615, 620 (Iowa App 1996) (noting
that statute requires parent, guardian, or legal custodian's presence for juveniles under sixteen
years of age); Kansas, Matter of B.M.B., 264 Kan 417, 955 P2d 1302, 1312-13 (1998) (holding that
juvenile under fourteen years of age must be accompanied by interested adult to waive rights);
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v A Juvenile (NO 7), 389 Mass 128, 449 NE2d 654, 657 (1983)
(holding that juveniles under fourteen must be accompanied by interested adult to waive rights);
Montana, Evans v Montana Eleventh Judicial Dist Court, 298 Mont 279, 995 P2d 455, 458 (2000)
(applying statutory per se rule for defendants under sixteen years of age); North Carolina, NC
Gen Stat Ann § 7B-2101 (Michie 1999) (disallowing waiver for juvenile under fourteen years
without specific adult presence); Oklahoma, 10 Okla Stat Ann § 7303-3.1 (West 1998) (imple-
menting per se rule for juveniles under sixteen); and West Virginia, Matter of Steven William T,
201 W Va 654, 499 SE2d 876, 884 (1997) (noting that West Virginia law requires parental pres-
ence for interrogations of juveniles under sixteen).
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waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.6, In a sense,
per se rules are only an addition to the totality of the circumstances
rule, invalidating any waiver if two factors are present: (1) the accused
is under a specified age and (2) no interested adult was present at the
interrogation. But these two factors do not need to be met to invali-
date a waiver if the totality of the circumstances suggests that the
waiver was defective.
In some states, per se rules are statutory. For example, the Colo-
rado Children's Code provides that statements made by a juvenile
during a custodial interrogation are not admissible against the juvenile
"unless a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juve-
nile was present," and both the adult and the juvenile were made
aware of their rights.6 Similarly, the Oklahoma Juvenile Code requires
the presence and informed consent of both the juvenile and "the par-
ents, guardian, attorney, adult relative, adult caretaker, or legal custo-
dian of the child" in order to validate a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination by a juvenile under the age of sixteen. In North
Carolina a similar standard applies, but only to juveniles under the age
of fourteen.4
In other states, per se rules are the product of judicial interpreta-
tions of state constitutions or of state juvenile procedure statutes. The
Supreme Court of Kansas recently held that "a juvenile under 14
years of age must be given an opportunity to consult with his or her
parent, guardian, or attorney as to whether he or she will waive his or
her rights to an attorney and against self-incrimination. ' o The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts similarly held that no waiver
by a juvenile under the age of fourteen could be effective without the
presence of an interested adult.6 Several other states created per se
rules in the wake of Gault, only to overturn them later.
61 See Schlam, 26 U Toledo L Rev at 915 (cited in note 57) (describing the operation of per
se rules).
62 Col Rev Stat Ann § 19-2-511(1).
63 10 Okla Stat Ann § 7303-3.1.
64 NC Gen Stat Ann § 7B-2101.
65 Matter of B.M.B., 955 P2d at 1312-13.
66 A Juvenile (NOI), 449 NE2d at 657.
67 This has occurred in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana. The cases establishing per se
rules are Freeman v Wilcox, 119 Ga App 325, 167 SE2d 163, 166-67 (1969); Commonwealth v
McCutchen, 463 Pa 90, 343 A2d 669, 670 (1975); and In Interest of Dino, 359 S2d 586, 594 (La
1978). The cases switching to totality rules are Riley v State, 237 Ga 105, 226 SE2d 922, 926
(1976); Commonwealth v Williams, 504 Pa 511, 475 A2d 1283, 1287-88 (1984); and State v Fer-
nandez, 712 S2d 485,490 (La 1998).
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C. Definitions of "Interested Adult"
Factors such as the relationship between an interested adult and ajuvenile, the intelligence of an interested adult, or a conflict of interest
between a juvenile and an interested adult can affect the validity of ajuvenile's waiver of rights. Conflicts of interest between adults and ju-
veniles have often been ignored. Part I.C.1 discusses the grounds on
which a juvenile can challenge the competency of an interested adult.
Part I.C.2 looks at conflicts of interest in particular, and shows how
courts have misunderstood them.
1. Grounds for challenging the competency of an
interested adult.
In situations where an adult other than a member of the police or
prosecution was present at the custodial interrogation of a juvenile,
challenges by the juvenile to the admission of evidence based on the
incompetency of the adult can be roughly grouped into three catego-
ries: (1) challenges based on an insufficiently close bond between the
adult and the juvenile (a lack of interest);" (2) challenges based on the
adult's failure to understand the situation;" and (3) challenges based
on a conflict of interest between the juvenile and the adult.0 Although
the first two categories present interesting legal questions, the close
relationship test that this Comment proposes is only relevant to the
third category of challenges.71
These challenges are relevant both to federal and state inquiries
under the totality of the circumstances standard, and to state inquiries
in per se rule jurisdictions. Of course, a challenge is more likely to de-
cide the case in a per se rule jurisdiction than in a totality of the cir-
cumstances jurisdiction. In a per se rule jurisdiction, proof of the in-
competency of the interested adult will invalidate the juvenile's waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination.72 In a totality of the circum-
stances jurisdiction, proof of the incompetency of the interested adult
will be only one factor to be weighed along with all the other circum-
stances.73
68 See, for example, Commonwealth v Smith, 472 Pa 492, 372 A2d 797,801 (1977) ("If the
adult is one who is not concerned with the interest of the minor, the protection sought to be af-
forded is illusory.").
69 Empirical evidence suggests that adults frequently misunderstand their Miranda rights,
although they are somewhat more likely to understand them than are juveniles. See Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights:An Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal L Rev 1134,
1151-52,1160-61 (1980).
70 See Little v Arkansas, 435 US 957 (1978) (Marshall dissenting from denial of certiorari).
71 See Part III.
72 See Part I.B.2.
73 See Parts I.A.2 and I.B.1.
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2. Challenges based on a conflict of interest between the
juvenile and the adult.
Although the Supreme Court has not applied its totality of the
circumstances test to an interested adult since Fare, or specifically ad-
dressed the question of what factors should be considered when de-
ciding the presence or competence of an interested adult, in Little v
Arkansas," Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from
the denial of certiorari in a case in which a thirteen-year-old girl had
been convicted of murder.75 The prosecution's case had depended
heavily on a confession obtained from the girl on the day of the mur-
der.' Prior to making the confession, the girl had met alone with her
mother, the wife of the murder victim, who had previously been ques-
tioned by the police and who believed that she was herself a suspect."
When the mother emerged from this meeting, she stated that the girl
wanted to confess.8 The girl was then advised of her Miranda rights,
waived her rights, and confessed, all in the presence of her mother and
the police. 9
Justice Marshall, citing Haley, Gallegos, and Gault, acknowledged
the usefulness, in most circumstances, of the presence of an interested
adult during the custodial interrogation of a juvenile." In this particu-
lar case, "[t]he mother, however, was plainly not in a position to pro-
vide rational advice with only the child's interests in mind, especially
on the day of the murder."8'
Justice Marshall recognized that,
to uphold a child's waiver on the ground that she received paren-
tal advice is surely questionable when the parent has two obvious
conflicts of interest, one arising from the possibility that the par-
ent herself is a suspect, and the other from the fact that she is
"advising" the person accused of killing her spouse.2
Justice Marshall was concerned that an accused juvenile might not re-
ceive the proper level of protection from an adult who is herself a sus-
pect in the crime or who has strong ties to the victim of the crime."'
State courts disagree over how to determine when a conflict of
interest exists between a juvenile and an otherwise interested adult.
74 435 US 957 (1978) (Marshall dissenting from denial of certiorari).
75 Id at 957.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id at 957-58.
79 Id at 958.
80 Id at 958-59.
81 Id at 959.
82 Id at 960.
83 Both circumstances existed in Little. Id.
20011
The University of Chicago Law Review
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has thrown out a ju-
venile's confession where the interested adult had an intimate rela-
tionship with another suspect in the case.4 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, in contrast, requires that an interested adult actually
be antagonistic to the juvenile in order to invalidate the juvenile's
confession."
In the case of Matter of Steven William T," which arose in West
Virginia, Steven's aunt had confessed to a murder, and implicated Ste-
ven as an accessory." Steven admitted a small role in the murder dur-
ing a custodial interrogation, at which a close adult friend of the fam-
ily, Ms. Whetzel, was present." Later, at another interview where both
Ms. Whetzel and Steven's biological mother were present, he admitted
having shot the victim." He subsequently repudiated this statement
and claimed that Ms. Whetzel had pressured him into making it."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found the con-
fession inadmissible.' Despite a parent or guardian's presence, a con-
fession "may be rendered meaningless where the parent or guardian
has a conflict of interest with the child or has no real parental rela-
tionship with the child, as was the case here where the biological
mother had not seen the child in four years." The potential conflict of
interest in this case arose from Steven's contention "that Ms. Whetzel
pressured him into confessing to the murder in order to protect [his
aunt], the woman with whom Ms. Whetzel allegedly maintained an in-
timate relationship."93 In response, the court formulated the following
conflict rule:
[W]here law enforcement authorities seeking to interrogate a ju-
venile have knowledge regarding a potential conflict of interest
between parent (or custodian) and child with respect to the mat-
ters which are the subject of the interrogation, such law enforce-
ment authorities must make further inquiry regarding the appro-
priate person to be present with the juvenile.]
84 See text accompanying notes 86-94.
85 See text accompanying notes 95-112.
86 201 W Va 654,499 SE2d 876 (1997).
87 Id at 879.
88 Id.
89 Id at 880.
90 Idat 881.
91 Although the court discusses the voluntariness of the confession for several pages, it ap-
pears to base its holding on the failure of the police to promptly present Steven to a magistrate.
Id at 883 ("While we invalidate the confession based upon our prompt presentment discussion
above, we also address several unorthodox facets of Steven's confession to murder.").
92 Id at 884-85.
93 Id at 886.
94 Id.
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In contrast to West Virginia, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts has set a less protective standard for challenges based on a
conflict of interest. Massachusetts employs a per se rule requiring the
presence of an adult to validate a juvenile waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination if the juvenile is under fourteen. The ac-
cused in Commonwealth v Philip S.96 was twelve years old when the
police questioned him about his involvement in starting a fire that led
to the death of a firefighter." His mother was present at his interroga-
tion, and both he and his mother were read complete Miranda warn-
ings and indicated that they understood their rights.' The juvenile's
mother repeatedly encouraged him to tell the truth, and when at one
point the juvenile became angry and ran out of the room, his mother
brought him back.99 The juvenile, along with his mother, eventually ini-
tialed an inculpatory statement. ° When the interview was over, the
mother did not want her son to return home with her, so a social
worker arranged for the juvenile to stay in a juvenile home. '
The Supreme Judicial Court overturned the lower court's finding
that the juvenile's mother was not an "interested adult":
We reject the notion that a parent who fails to tell a child not to
speak to interviewing officials, who advises the child to tell the
truth, or who fails to seek legal assistance immediately is a disin-
terested parent. Our interested adult rule, which we conclude was
satisfied in this case, is not violated because a parent fails to pro-
vide what, in hindsight and from a legal perspective, might have
been optimum advice."°
Although the outcome in Philip S. differs from that in Steven William
T, there was no showing in Philip S. of an actual conflict of interest
between Philip and his mother,' 3 as there was in Steven William T
95 For juveniles over the age of fourteen Massachusetts courts apply a totality of the
circumstances test. See Commonwealth v A Juvenile (NO1), 389 Mass 128,449 NE2d 654 (1983):
We conclude that, for the Commonwealth successfully to demonstrate a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver by a juvenile, in most cases it should show that a parent or an interested adult
was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his rights to the
juvenile so that the juvenile understands the significance of waiver of these rights. For the
purpose of obtaining the waiver, in the case of juveniles who are under the age of fourteen,
we conclude that no waiver can be effective without this added protection.
Id at 657.




100 Id at 230.
101 Id.
102 Id at 231.
103 The court noted:
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Thus, under Massachusetts law, an interested adult need not fulfill the
role of counsel for the juvenile; it is sufficient if the adult has the ca-
pacity to understand the situation and is not "actually antagonistic" to
the juvenile.1'O
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court elaborated on this
standard in Commonwealth v McCra.'°  The defendant in that case was
a fifteen-year-old boy who confessed to murdering his father, mother,
and sister, and was convicted.'" The boy's aunt was present during his
entire interrogation.'7 Because the defendant was over the age of
fourteen, under Massachusetts law he was only required to have an
"opportunity to consult with an interested adult," but the defense
claimed on appeal that "he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity
to consult with an interested adult because of his aunt's close relation-
ship to the victims and her concern over what happened to them.' ""
The court rejected this argument. Citing Philip S., the court stated:
We do not hold a parent or an interested adult to the standards
to which we would hold lawyers in explaining a defendant's
rights and the possible consequences of waiver. The fact that the
defendant's aunt was the sister of one of the victims does not re-
quire the conclusion that she would be unable to act as an inter-
ested adult.°
The McCra decision reaches the opposite conclusion from the
West Virginia decision. In Steven William T, Ms. Whetzel's "intimate
relationship" with another suspect in the case made her incompetent
to act as an interested adult during custodial interrogations of Steven
because it constituted a "potential conflict of interest" under West
Virginia law."' In contrast, the defendant's aunt in McCra was held
competent to serve as an interested adult despite the fact that one of
There is no objective basis in the record to support a finding that interviewing officials
could have concluded that Mrs. Smith was antagonistic toward her son. She appeared con-
cerned about her son, not angry with him, attended both interviews, and was attentive to
the administration of Miranda warnings and provisions about waiving rights.
Id.
104 Id. The court stated:
If... it should have been reasonably apparent to the officials questioning a juvenile that the
adult who was present on his or her behalf.., was actually antagonistic toward the juvenile,
a finding would be warranted that the juvenile has not been assisted by an interested adult
and did not have the opportunity for consultation contemplated by our rule.
Id.
105 427 Mass 564,694 NE2d 849 (1998).
106 Id at 850.
107 Id at 851.
108 Id.
109 Id at 852-53 (citations omitted).
110 499 SE2d at 886.
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the victims was her sister."' This relationship did not make the aunt
"actually antagonistic" under Massachusetts law." '
A conflict of interest standard such as the one utilized in Steven
William T is desirable for several reasons. Like per se rules requiring
an interested adult, a conflict of interest standard would reduce confu-
sion in application by the police and force courts to be more vigilant
in guarding against coerced confessions." It would focus attention on
a problem that courts and the police often overlook in determining
the voluntariness of juvenile confessions. West Virginia's consideration
of an interested adult's "intimate relationship" with another suspect
suggests the approach explored in Part II: the close relationship stan-
dard of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
II. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND THE
"CLOSE RELATIONSHIP" STANDARD
This Part first examines negligent infliction of emotional distress,
which different jurisdictions have limited by requiring plaintiffs to
show either a physical impact, presence in a zone of danger, or a close
relationship with the victim of physical harm. This Part then examines
particular relationships that have or have not been defined as close,
and shows that close relationships have been limited to immediate
family relationships or, in some jurisdictions, similarly strong relation-
ships.
A. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
A plaintiff in a suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress
seeks to recover damages for mental or emotional harm, rather than
physical harm, that resulted from the defendant's negligence."4 Negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress differs from more conventional
pain and suffering damages. Pain and suffering refers to mental or
emotional harms that stem directly from a physical injury."' Negligent
infliction of emotional distress refers to wrongdoing that causes men-
tal or emotional harm, which may manifest itself in physical symp-
toms, but which does not result from physical injury to the person suf-
fering it"1
6
111 McCra, 694 NE2d at 853.
112 Id.
113 See text accompanying notes 58-59.
114 See Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall, 512 US 532,544 (1994) (defining "negligent in-
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Wrongdoing may cause emotional injuries that are very remote
in time or space from the conduct that caused them."7 Courts have
worried that negligent infliction of emotional distress could result in
nearly infinite liability for defendants, and have sought to limit the
class of plaintiffs that can recover for emotional and mental harms."
Today there are three competing tests which different jurisdictions re-
quire a plaintiff to meet to recover for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress: (1) the physical impact test, (2) the zone of danger test,
and (3) the relative bystander test."9
Of the three tests, the physical impact test places the highest bur-
den on plaintiffs.'20 Under this test, in order to recover for emotional
or mental harm, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he received a
physical impact or injury at the same time as he received the emo-
tional or mental harm. 2' Five states currently use the physical impact• 122
test under certain circumstances.
The zone of danger test allows plaintiffs to recover under a
broader range of circumstances. Under this test, a plaintiff may re-
cover for emotional or mental harm if he demonstrates that the de-
fendant's negligent conduct either physically impacted him or placed
him in immediate risk of physical harm.' Fourteen jurisdictions use
the zone of danger rule,"' and the Supreme Court has held that the
zone of danger rule applies to claims under the Federal Employer's
117 Id at 545.
118 Id at 546.
119 See id at 546-48.
120 Id at 547.
121 Id.
122 The states are Florida, R.J. v Humana of Florida, Inc, 652 S2d 360, 362 (Fla 1995); Geor-
gia, Lee v State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, 272 Ga 583,533 SE2d 82,84 (2000); Indiana, Shuam-
ber v Henderson, 579 NE2d 452,454 (Ind 1991); Kentucky, Deutsch v Shein, 597 SW2d 141,145-
46 (Ky 1980); and Oregon, Hammond v Central Lane Communications Center, 312 Or 17, 816
P2d 593,597 (1991). Some of these states have carved out significant exceptions to the physical
impact rule. See Jacob A. Stein, 2 Stein on Personal Injury Damages § 10:31 n 27 (3d ed 1997).
123 See Consolidated Rail, 512 US at 547-48.
124 The jurisdictions are Arizona, Keck v Jackson, 122 Ariz 114, 593 P2d 668, 670 (Ariz
1979); Colorado, Towns v Anderson, 195 Colo 517,579 P2d 1163 (1978); Delaware, Robb v Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co, 58 Del 454, 210 A2d 709, 714-15 (1965); District of Columbia, Williams v
Baker, 572 A2d 1062, 1064 (DC App 1990); Illinois, Rickey v Chicago Transit Authority, 98 I11 2d
546, 457 NE2d 1, 5 (1983); Maryland, Resavage v Davies, 199 Md 479, 86 A2d 879, 880 (1952);
Minnesota, Stadler v Cross, 295 NW2d 552,554 (Minn 1980); Missouri, Asaro v Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hospital, 799 SW2d 595,599 (Mo 1990); New York, Bovsun v Sanperi, 473 NYS2d 357,
461 NE2d 843, 846 (1984); North Dakota, Whetham v Bismarck Hospital, 197 NW2d 678 (ND
1972); Tennessee, Ramsey v Beavers, 931 SW2d 527, 531 (Tenn 1996); Utah, Boucher v Dixie
Medical Center, 850 P2d 1179, 1181 (Utah 1992); Vermont, Jobin v McQuillen, 158 Vt 322, 609
A2d 990,993 (1992); and Wisconsin, Garrett v City of New Berlin, 122 Wis 2d 223,362 NW2d 137,
141-42 (Wis 1985). See Stein, 2 Personal Injury Damages § 10:33 n 42 (cited in note 122).
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Liability Act.24 Some jurisdictions modify the rule to include a re-
quirement of a close relationship to the victim of physical harm. '
The relative bystander test, the broadest of the three tests, was
first employed in 1968 by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v
Legg. The court held that a woman who suffered emotional and
physical harm when she witnessed the negligently inflicted death of
her daughter could recover for her damages, even though she was out-
side the zone of danger.'28 The court held that reasonable foreseeabil-
ity should determine whether a plaintiff could recover for emotional
harm, and listed three factors to consider in determining foreseeabil-
ity:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2)
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any rela-
tionship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
12
1
Under this test, defendants have a duty to prevent foreseeable
emotional injuries," ' and a plaintiff only needs to show that her emo-
tional injuries were foreseeable and caused by the defendant's negli-
gent conduct in order to recover. 3' Nearly half the states now utilize
132
some form of the relative bystander rule.
B. The "Close Relationship" Standard
In those jurisdictions which utilize the relative bystander test,
courts in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases must examine
the relationship between the victim of the physical injury and the
plaintiff to determine whether any emotional injury to the plaintiff
was foreseeable. 1 In jurisdictions that add a close relationship re-
quirement to the zone of danger rule, courts must perform the same
inquiry. ' Some relationships are uniformly considered close, some re-
125 See Consolidated Rail, 512 US at 557.
126 See, for example, Keck, 593 P2d at 670 (requiring close relationship in conjunction with
zone of danger test in Arizona).
127 68 Cal 2d 728,441 P2d 912 (1968).
128 Id at 914,924-25.
129 Id at 920.
130 Id.
131 Id at 919-21.
132 See Consolidated Rail, 512 US at 549 n 10.
133 See text accompanying notes 127-32.
134 See text accompanying note 126.
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lationships are never considered close, and some relationships fall in
between.
Courts uniformly agree that certain relationships between imme-
diate family members always constitute close relationships for pur-
poses of determining forseeability."' A parent,"6 child, " ' sibling, lm or
spouse'39 of the victim will always meet the close relationship standard.
Courts also uniformly agree that certain relationships can never
constitute a close relationship for purposes of determining foresee-
ability. No court has allowed a plaintiff to recover for emotional injury
resulting from witnessing physical harm to a complete stranger.'4° Re-
lationships between friends or co-workers are also never classified as
close. 141
There are certain relationships which some jurisdictions consider
close relationships and which other jurisdictions do not. Unmarried
but romantically involved partners may have a close relationship in
141 143some jurisdictions, while in others they may not. The same is true
135 See David Sampedro, When Living as Husband and Wife Isn't Enough: Reevaluating Dil-
Ion's Close Relationship Test in Light of Dunphy v. Gregor, 25 Stetson L Rev 1085, 1101 n 88
(1996) (surveying cases accepting immediate family relationships as close relationships).
136 See, for example, Bowen v Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co, 183 Wis 2d 627,517 NW2d
432,445-46 (1994) (holding that mother could recover for emotional injury resulting from son's
death when hit by automobile); Matthews v Amberwood Associates Ltd Partnership, 351 Md 544,
719 A2d 119, 133-34 (1998) (allowing mother to recover for emotional injury when son was
killed by pit bull).
137 See, for example, Jones v Sanger, 204 W Va 333,512 SE2d 590, 595 (1998) (holding that
son who witnessed mother's death in car accident could recover for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress); Grandstaff v City of Borger, Texas, 767 F2d 161, 172 (5th Cir 1985) (finding that
stepsons have close relationship with stepfather under Texas law).
138 See, for example, Goncalvez v Patuto, 188 NJ Super 620, 458 A2d 146, 151 (1983) (find-
ing that "fraternal relationship presumptively qualifies" as close relationship); Kelly v Bass En-
terprises Production Co, 17 F Supp 2d 591,598 (E D La 1998) (noting that Louisiana law allows
brother to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
139 See, for example, Kraszewski v Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc, 916 P2d 241,
247 (Okla 1996) (finding that husband has close relationship); Ledford v Delta Airlines, Inc, 658 F
Supp 540, 543 (S D Fla 1987) (finding that spouse meets close relationship test under Florida
law).
140 See, for example, Devereux v Allstate Insurance Co, 557 S2d 1091, 1098 (La App 1990)
(finding relationship with victim whom plaintiff "barely knew at sight" too distant for close
relationship); Migliori v Airborne Freight Corp, 426 Mass 629,690 NE2d 413,418 (1998) (holding
that stranger who attempted to rescue victim of physical injury could not recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress).
141 See, for example, Hislop v Salt River Project Agr Improvement and Power Dist, 197 Ariz
553,5 P3d 267,272 (Ariz App 2000) (holding that coworker and friend could not recover for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress). Some dissenting judges have argued that whether a rela-
tionship between friends or coworkers is close should be a question of fact to be determined case
by case. See id at 276 (Garbarino dissenting) (arguing that closeness should be a jury question);
Smith v Kings Entertainment Co, 99 Ohio App 3d 1, 649 NE2d 1252, 1254 (1994) (Bettman dis-
senting) (arguing that closeness of relationship should have "a bearing only on the extent of [the
plaintiffs] damages, not on her right to recover").
142 See, for example, Dunphy v Gregor, 136 NJ 99, 642 A2d 372, 380 (1994) (plaintiff could
recover for emotional injury resulting from death of fianc6e where the two cohabited and had an
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for aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews,'" and also for cousins.'5 In these
situations, whether a relationship is close depends on the facts of a
particular case in some jurisdictions, while in other jurisdictions rela-
tionships outside the immediate family can never be classified as close.
III. APPLYING THE "CLOSE RELATIONSHIP" STANDARD
TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
This Part first describes the operation of the proposed close rela-
tionship standard and summarizes its advantages. Then Part III.B sug-
gests an alternative "immediate family" standard for jurisdictions
where negligent infliction of emotional distress law is undeveloped.
Part III.C examines problems with the close relationship standard and
alternative proposals, and finally Part III.D applies the standard to
two cases.
A. Advantages of Applying the Close Relationship Standard in
Juvenile Interrogation Cases
Stated generally, this Comment proposes that when determining
whether or not an interested adult has a conflict of interest, a court
should apply its jurisdiction's close relationship standard from torts to
the relationships between the interested adult and all the victims and
other suspects in the crime of which the juvenile is accused. If any of
the relationships meet the close relationship test, it would show that
the interested adult has a significant conflict of interest, which should
weigh against the admissibility of statements made by the juvenile un-
der the adult's care. In jurisdictions where an interested adult is per se
required, a close relationship would invalidate the juvenile's waiver
and make any of the juvenile's statements under the waiver inadmis-
sible. In jurisdictions where the presence of an interested adult is only
one factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, a close
intimate familial relationship).
143 See, for example, Elden v Sheldon, 46 Cal 3d 267, 758 P2d 582, 586 (1988) (holding that
plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress resulting from physical injury to person with
whom he cohabitated and had a relationship akin to marriage).
144 Compare Kriventsov v San Rafael Taxicabs, Inc, 186 Cal App 3d 1445,229 Cal Rptr 768,
770 (1986) (finding uncle's relationship with nephew close for purposes of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, where uncle and nephew were related by blood and lived in the same house-
hold), with Trombetta v Conkling, 187 AD2d 213,593 NYS2d 670,671 (1993) (holding that niece
could not sue for emotional distress on the basis of physical injury to her aunt, despite their inti-
mate relationship).
145 Compare Trapp v Schuyler Construction, 149 Cal App 3d 1140, 197 Cal Rptr 411, 412
(1983) (holding that relationship between first cousins did not qualify as close), with Barnhill v
Davis, 300 NW2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981) (extending close relationship status to all persons "re-
lated within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity").
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relationship would weigh in favor of finding the waiver invalid and the
statements inadmissible.
The types of relationships that suffice to award damages to by-
standers of accidents should disqualify anyone with such a relation-
ship to a victim of the accident from advising the person accused of
committing the accident, given the closeness of the relationship and
the intensity of the emotions involved. One court has said of emo-
tional distress:
It is the presence of deep, intimate, familial ties between the
plaintiff and the physically injured person that makes the harm to
emotional tranquility so serious and compelling. The genuine suf-
fering which flows from such harm stands in stark contrast to the
setbacks and sorrows of everyday life, or even to the apprehen-
sion of harm to another, less intimate person. '
This idea that certain "intimate, familial ties" can give rise to a
unique form of "genuine suffering" seems equally applicable whether
the injury in question happens to be classified in a given legal pro-
ceeding as a tort, as in emotional distress litigation, or a crime, as in
juvenile interrogations.
This standard has the advantage of providing a clear rule to the
police when deciding whom to have present at the interrogation of a
juvenile. As long as the police follow the procedure set forth in the
rule, the police will know as soon as they begin an interrogation that
any statements made will not be thrown out of court on the basis of a
conflict of interest. The police simply can ask the interested adult, be-
fore beginning questioning, what his or her relationship is to the other
suspects in the crime, if there are any, and to the victims of the crime. 7
The police could be kept informed of the conflict of interest standard
with a simple information card. Many jurisdictions already use such
cards to aid the police in explaining rights to suspects, or use special
forms to ensure that juveniles fully understand their rights, so it would
not be expensive or burdensome to add the conflict of interest stan-
dard. If the interested adult has a close relationship with any of the
suspects or victims, the police would then need to find another adult-
typically a parent, guardian, or adult family member-with no such
close relationships to serve as the interested adult.
146 Portee v Jaffee, 84 NJ 88,417 A2d 521,526-27 (1980).
147 The approach suggested by this Comment takes for granted that an adult who is herself
a victim of the crime or a suspect in the crime should not be competent to act as an interested
adult. Although it might seem absurd that a victim of a crime could potentially be in the position
of serving as an interested adult and advising the juvenile accused of the very same crime, the
possibility is not foreclosed by the case law.
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If no interested adult without close relationships to victims or
other suspects can be found, the next action of the police would de-
pend on the jurisdiction. In a totality of the circumstances jurisdiction,
the police might have the option of proceeding with the interrogation
without any interested adult. If there were no other defects in the in-
terrogation, the accused's statements would very likely be admissi-
ble."' In a per se rule jurisdiction, proceeding with the interrogation
without an interested adult would have little purpose, as any state-
ments made would be inadmissible. 9 The juvenile would have to be
appointed an attorney or a guardian ad litem. This also would be an
option in a totality of the circumstances jurisdiction if the surrounding
circumstances indicated a likelihood of involuntariness absent the
presence of an adult.
Another argument in favor of this standard is that it would create
consistency among different areas of the law. If an adult has a close
enough relationship with a person to sue for emotional distress in tort
for an injury caused to that person, common sense suggests that he
should not be held competent to advise a child, if that child is accused
of committing that person's injury. A similar analysis applies to per-
sons suspected of a crime. It seems intuitive that the definition of
"close relationship" should be the same whether arising in criminal
procedure or in tort law."
It is important to note that the standard this Comment advocates
does not require a juvenile to show that the interested adult present at
her interrogation in fact could have sued the juvenile for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress and successfully recovered. Such a re-
quirement would place a very high burden on the juvenile for exclud-
ing statements made by reason of an invalid waiver. A juvenile would
not, under the standard proposed by this Comment, have to prove the
other elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress, such as
causation and damages. This Comment's approach does not intend to
borrow the entire negligence action for infliction of emotional dis-
tress; it only borrows that portion aimed at defining close relation-
ships. Thus a juvenile would only need to show that the adult's rela-
tionship with a victim or other suspect could satisfy the close relation-
ship element of infliction of emotional distress.
148 See Parts I.A.2 and I.B.1.
149 See Part I.B.2.
150 See Jay W. Stein, The Hobgoblin Doctrine: Identifying "Foolish" Consistency in the Law,
29 Tex Tech L Rev 1017, 1017-22 (1998) (noting that consistency has been the rationale behind
diverse legal doctrines such as stare decisis and the Uniform Commercial Code); John E. Coons,
Consistency, 75 Cal L Rev 59, 59-60 (1987) (discussing the Aristotelian maxim that "like cases
should be treated alike").
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It also should be emphasized that this approach is not intended to
be the exclusive means of testing the competency of an interested
adult. The close relationship approach furnishes a test for eliminating
the most egregious cases of conflict of interest only; it does not dis-
place other means of testing adult competency or conflicts of interest
arising from other sources. A person may still be incompetent to serve
as an interested adult, even if he has no conflict of interest, if he has an
insufficiently close bond with the juvenile or if he is unable to under-
stand the proceedings." ' In addition, conflicts of interest between par-
ent and child may also exist outside the context of close relationships
with victims or other suspects."'
B. Adopting Widely Accepted Close Relationships
The most significant difficulties with the approach suggested
above is the lack of well-developed emotional distress law in some ju-
risdictions and the explicit rejection of the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress in others."' In those jurisdictions, applying the
close relationship standard of emotional distress will be either fruitless
or impossible.
As a simplified alternative, this Comment proposes that "close re-
lationship" can be defined for the purposes of investigating conflicts
of interest as any relationship between immediate family members;
that is, a relationship between a parent or guardian and a child, a rela-
tionship between brothers and sisters, or a marital relationship. These
relationships have universally been accepted as close relationships by
those courts that make close relationship determinations in negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases. '4 There are obvious problems
with this definition. The definition will frequently be either overinclu-
sive or underinclusive, as an immediate family relationship is no guar-
antee of an actual close relationship, and actual close relationships of-
ten exist outside of the traditional immediate family." But this ap-proximates the definition chosen by many states that have considered
151 Thus the close relationship test only applies to the third category of interested adult
challenges mentioned in Part I.C.1, not to the first two. See text accompanying notes 68-70.
152 See, for example, In re Ricky H., 2 Cal 3d 513,468 P2d 204,210-11 (1970) (finding waiver
ineffective because juvenile waived right to counsel rather than cause his father to go further
into debt to the county).
153 See Sampedro, 25 Stetson L Rev at 1100-01 n 87 (cited in note 135) (surveying states
that have rejected the relative bystander test in favor of the zone of danger test).
154 See Part II.B.
155 See Laura M. Raisty, Note, Bystander Distress and Loss of Consortium:An Examination
of the Relationship Requirements in Light of Romer v. Evans, 65 Fordham L Rev 2647, 2659-64
(1997) (critiquing courts' formalist definition of close relationships that limits such relationships
to the nuclear family and finding a functional definition to be more appropriate).
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the issue, and despite its defects, its simplicity may make it superior to
the state-by-state approach advocated above.'5
As appealing as the simplicity of the immediate family standard
may be, there are several reasons why it should only be applied in
those jurisdictions that lack their own body of close relationship law.
First, unless the jurisdiction happens to also define close relationships
as immediate family for emotional distress, the consistency rationale
of the close relationship standard would be entirely eliminated. Sec-
ond, the close relationship approach allows a state to base its conflict
of interest standard on its own emotional distress law, rather than on a
conglomeration of many states' decisions. This allows the close rela-
tionship approach to be more flexible and allows more innovation
than an immediate family approach. Finally, the immediate family ap-
proach includes only the most intimate relationships that have been
universally recognized by the courts as "close." Some states have more
broadly recognized intimate relationships as close, and those relation-
ships should also be included in the conflict of interest standard.
C. Potential Difficulties and Counterproposals
It might be argued that the close relationship approach would
leave open the possibility that an adult might not reveal a relationship
with a suspect or a victim. But the police would still have the option
under this approach of finding another interested adult if they have
some reason for believing that the adult has a conflict of interest,
which presumably they would do if they intend for the juvenile's
statements to be admissible. Also, a court would not be obligated to
admit statements made after a waiver if it felt that the guidance pro-
vided by the adult was tainted by a conflict of interest. Difficulties
might arise in situations where a suspect or a victim is not identified
until after the interrogation of the juvenile. But in most such cases the
adult would presumably be just as unaware of this potential conflict as
the police, and therefore not subject to any actual conflict of interest.
Another potential standard which some might advocate, the con-
flict of interest rules for attorneys,57 is unworkable for several reasons.
Many rules applicable to attorneys would be irrelevant or nonsensical
when applied to interested adults." Perhaps more importantly, at least
156 See John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff-Witness as
Affecting Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing
Victim's Injury or Death, 94 ALR3d 486 (1979) (surveying close relationship cases, which have
generally held that immediate family relationships qualify and other relationships do not).
157 See American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judi-
cial Conduct Rule 1.7 (1983) (reviewing when a lawyer should not represent a client due to a
conflict of interest).
158 The portion of the rule requiring client consent after consultation, Rule 1.7(b)(2), would
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one state court has specifically said that standards for attorneys would
be inappropriate in the context of interested adults."'
It also might be objected that this Comment's close relationship
approach would insufficiently protect juvenile rights if it allowed, for
example, the cousin of a murder victim to advise the accused mur-
derer as to his privilege against self-incrimination. '6' One response to
this objection is that the fault lies with tort law, and that tort law
should be modified to expand the concept of close relationships in
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. But in addition, even
where tort law defines close relationships narrowly, this Comment's
approach must be considered in the context of the totality of the cir-
cumstances standard. The Constitution invalidates any waiver made
when the totality of the circumstances suggests it was not knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. This approach would not lessen that protec-
tion. At the very least, this Comment's approach would eliminate the
most egregious cases of conflicts of interest, although it might leave
the closest cases, in some jurisdictions, to the totality of the circum-
stances test.
D. Examples of the Application of the Close Relationship Standard
It may be useful to illustrate this approach by applying it to the
facts of Little and McCra.16' In Little, the defendant's mother was
"emotionally distraught [and] crying" at the time she was expected to
be advising her daughter. 62 These reactions are not unlike those found
in a typical infliction of emotional distress suit. 3 Under the close rela-
tionship standard, the statements made in Little would be excluded as
the product of an invalid waiver. The interested adult present was thejuvenile's mother, and the mother's husband was the victim of the ju-
venile's suspected crime. As a spouse, Little's mother has a sufficiently
close relationship with her husband to meet the close relationship
be particularly troublesome. It is hard to imagine a parent or relative with no training in the law
calmly discussing the potential conflict he has with the accused juvenile, and then receiving
meaningful consent.
159 See Philip S., 611 NE2d at 232 n 6 ("[Wle cannot hold a parent or an interested adult to
the standards to which we would hold lawyers in explaining a defendant's rights and the possible
consequences of waiver.").
160 See, for example, Trapp v Schuyler Construction, 149 Cal App 3d 1140,197 Cal Rptr 411,
412 (1983) (holding that first cousins do not have a close relationship). Such a narrow interpreta-
tion of "close" would permit a murder victim's cousin to act as an interested adult under this
Comment's proposed test.
161 See Part I.C.2.
162 435 US at 960.
163 Of course, many interested adult cases are not similar to emotional distress suits. Poten-
tial interested adults often will not have witnessed the crime at issue, or will not have suffered
sufficient emotional distress to recover damages. This Comment does not limit its anaiysis, how-
ever, to cases as strong as the defendant's in Little.
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prong of negligent infliction of emotional distress.'m Although Arkan-
sas does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as a
cause of action,'65 a spouse would meet the alternative "immediate
family" standard of this Comment's approach. Thus the close relation-
ship of Little's mother to the victim should make her incompetent to
serve as the juvenile's interested adult, by way of conflict of interest.
McCra is a similar case. The interested adult was the sister of one
of the victims.'6' Under this Comment's approach, the validity of the
juvenile's waiver would depend in part upon whether the jurisdiction
considers a relationship between sisters a close relationship for the
purposes of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Massa-
chusetts holds that the parent-child relationship and the spousal rela-
tionship are close relationships, '67 as is a cohabitation relationship m
but no court in that state has ruled on the specific question of a rela-
tionship between sisters. As in Little, the immediate family standard
would fill in the gaps where state law has not yet ruled. Sisters are al-
ways considered closely related in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases, so McCra's aunt would be incompetent to function as an
interested adult for McCra.
The outcome in the case would also depend upon whether the ju-
risdiction is a per se or a totality of the circumstances jurisdiction.
Massachusetts applies a totality of the circumstances rule to defen-
dants of McCra's age, so the statements might be admissible even if
the interested adult were found incompetent. In a per se jurisdiction,
the waiver would be invalid if a conflict were demonstrated.
CONCLUSION
Courts recognize the value of the presence of an interested adult
during custodial interrogations of juveniles by the police. An adult
serves to explain rights to the juvenile which she may not understand,
to bolster the juvenile's confidence in an emotionally difficult situa-
164 As in many jurisdictions, Arkansas's law in this area is not well developed. See Her-
brand, Annotation, 94 ALR3d at 487-88 (cited in note 156) (reviewing cases in which a spousal
relationship fulfilled the relationship requirement to recover for emotional distress damages).
165 See Morgan v Batesville Casket Co, 1998 Ark App LEXIS 207, *5 (noting that "Arkansas
courts do not recognize a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress"). Ar-
kansas may be one of the only states not to do so. See Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall, 512
US 532, 545 n 3 (1994) (recognizing that Arkansas and Alabama have not clearly accepted negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress).
166 McCra, 694 NE2d at 851.
167 See Dziokonski v Babineau, 375 Mass 555, 380 NE2d 1295, 1302-03 (1978) (allowing a
mother to sue for emotional distress damages after witnessing injuries to her minor child and
permitting a husband to sue after learning about the death of his wife).
168 See Richmond v Shatford, 1995 Mass Super LEXIS 440, *7-10 (holding that an extended
cohabitation may be sufficient to establish a close relationship and that an immediate blood rela-
tion or affiliation is not mandatory).
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tion, and to witness and hopefully deter any abuses by the police.
What courts often do not recognize is that an adult in the interroga-
tion room will not always provide these benefits. Some adults may not
understand the juvenile's rights any better than the juvenile does;
some adults may have no interest in the juvenile's welfare. Worse,
some adults may have interests that are antagonistic to the juvenile's.
This Comment suggests a simple approach that can be used by the po-
lice and courts to help assure that such adults do not bring about un-
knowing, involuntary, or unintelligent juvenile waivers of the privilege
against self-incrimination. By excluding an adult as incompetent if he
has a close relationship, as defined in negligent infliction of emotional
distress tort cases, with any of the victims of the crime of which the ju-
venile is accused, or with any of the other suspects in the crime, courts
and the police can help prevent the admission of unconstitutionally
obtained confessions and can protect a juvenile's rights.
